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ABSTRACT 
Decentralized delivery of public services has been promoted as a means to enhance citizen voice and 
make service provision more responsive to users. Ethiopia has undertaken two rounds of decentralization, 
making first the regional states and then the district governments responsible for providing key public 
services. This paper explores whether decentralization has improved the quality of service delivery and 
citizen satisfaction with the services provided, focusing on agricultural extension. Specifically, we 
examine whether services are responsive to the needs and expressed demands of poor farmers, including 
women farmers. We focus on the institutional arrangements through which agricultural extension services 
are provided and how these contribute to efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in service delivery. 
We carried out qualitative research on these questions in four districts in four different regional 
states. We interviewed district government officials, community leaders, and representatives of civil 
society organizations, and carried out focus group discussions with men and women farmers. In all, we 
interviewed 105 people. 
We find that deployment of extension agents to rural communities (kebeles) has increased the 
agents’ knowledge of local problems as well as access to extension services for both female and male 
farmers. In addition, rapid expansion of the service has created opportunities for women to become 
agents. Both male and female agents offer services to women farmers. However, accountability remains 
almost entirely upward. Until recently, the extension approach in Ethiopia has focused on top-down 
promotion of technology packages. Agents’ incentives cause them to focus on promoting fixed 
technology packages rather than on adapting the packages to local needs and desires or integrating 
modern technology with farmers’ own knowledge. 
We conclude that greater emphasis on downward accountability in service provision would 
improve the quality. This would allow extension agents to adapt their services to the needs and 
knowledge of the farmers. 
Keywords: agricultural extension, decentralization, Ethiopia, gender, institutional analysis vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The quality of agricultural extension services is an especially important issue in Ethiopia, where 
agriculture dominates the economy, accounting for 85 percent of employment, 50 percent of exports, and 
43 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Over 80 percent of the country’s 91 million people live in 
rural areas (FAO 2010; CIA 2011), and most are extremely poor, with a daily per capita income of less 
than $0.50, and access to one hectare or less of land (IFAD 2011). In recognition of the centrality of 
agriculture in most Ethiopians’ lives, government policy emphasizes what it calls agricultural 
development–led industrialization (ADLI). 
Throughout the developing world, rural service provision is extremely difficult because of a triple 
challenge. Due to market failures, the private sector does not provide these services to poor rural dwellers 
to an extent that is desirable from society’s point of view. The state, however, is not very effective in 
providing these services either, so there is state failure. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or 
communities themselves are interesting alternative providers of these services, but they can also fail 
(Birner and Anderson 2007). 
Globally, rural women, especially those from poor households, face a particular burden. In view 
of the gender division of labor, they spend considerable time fetching water, getting healthcare for their 
children, and reaching markets. Girls have less access to education than boys, and maternal mortality is 
high if the specific healthcare needs of women are not met. Providing better services to women is not only 
necessary to realize their rights, but it contributes to economic growth and poverty reduction (Quisumbing 
et al. 1995; IFPRI 2000, 2005; Mason and King 2001). Providing better services to rural women is also 
essential in using agriculture for development (World Bank 2007; World Bank, FAO, and IFAD 2008). 
Women play an important role in agriculture, particularly in Africa, but this role often goes unrecognized 
due to perception bias. The perception of the roles that men and women play in agriculture is biased 
toward men, and as a consequence, perceptions about the need for rural services are biased toward men as 
well (Sen 1990a and b; World Bank, FAO, and IFAD 2008).  
Such perception bias is a serious problem in Ethiopia despite the enactment of gender equality 
policies. Although anyone who has spent just a short time in rural Ethiopia can readily observe that in 
most parts of the country women are intimately involved in all aspects of agricultural production, 
marketing, food procurement, and household nutrition, the view is widely held that women do not farm. 
This cultural perception remains strong even though numerous agricultural tasks are deemed women’s 
work, including weeding, harvesting, preparation of storage containers, management of all aspects of 
home gardens and poultry raising, transporting farm inputs to the field, and procurement of water for 
household use and some on-farm uses (EEA and EEPRI 2006). In many parts of Ethiopia, certain tasks 
are considered culturally inappropriate for women, notably plowing, even though female household heads 
often do their own plowing.  
The past decades have seen a range of governance reforms that can help to improve rural service 
provision (Birner 2007). These include democratization and decentralization. Eighty percent of all 
developing countries have engaged in some form of decentralization during the past decades (Work 
2002). These governance reform approaches have been linked with various efforts to improve gender 
sensitivity in service provision, including gender budgeting, quotas for women in political leadership 
positions, and so forth. Even though local empowerment is not always the explicit or implicit goal of 
decentralization, it brings government closer to the people, thus improving their options to make their 
demands heard and to hold public-sector agencies accountable. In Ethiopia, two waves of decentralization 
since 1991 have put first regional governments and, more recently, district governments in charge of 
delivery of key rural services. In keeping with the National Policy on Women, formulated in 1993, at all 
levels of government there are agencies and officials charged with ensuring gender equality in program 
implementation.  
By gender equality we mean equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for women and men, 
girls and boys, based on the premise that women and men should be treated in the same way. Gender 2 
equality is the absence of discrimination on the basis of a person’s sex in opportunities, in the allocation 
of resources and benefits, or in access to services such as agricultural advice. It implies that the interests, 
needs, and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognizing the diversity 
among different groups of women and men. 
In this paper, we explore how decentralized delivery of agricultural extension services in Ethiopia 
has affected the quantity and quality of services and whether it has improved gender-equitable service 
provision. The paper reports on the results of our research in four districts in four different regions of 
Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia has a long history of top-down approaches to governance featuring primarily upward 
accountability methods. Nevertheless, we found some promising moves away from this command-and-
control approach to public services in our study districts as well as some substantial efforts to improve 
service quality. This is in keeping with the high priority that the government’s policy agenda gives to 
capacity building and decentralization. The posting of agricultural extension agents (called development 
agents, or DAs, in Ethiopia) in the communities they serve has improved their attentiveness to farmers’ 
needs and constraints, and has also enhanced the working relationship between these advisors and their 
clients. At the same time, DAs’ technical skills have improved, since an increasing number have at least 
three years of postsecondary training in agricultural development. 
The extension service has historically been top-down with inadequate adaptation to local 
agroecological conditions and needs. The government of Ethiopia has taken diverse initiatives to advance 
agricultural development in the last two decades. The agricultural sector is developing with increasing 
participation from the private sector, including progressive farmers and farmer cooperatives, and this 
participation requires revisiting the extension system to better fit it to emerging demands in the 
agricultural sector (from small farmers, farmer investors, and the private sector).  
We find that the current institutional arrangements for extension service delivery in our four study 
districts have great potential to facilitate sustainable, participatory, gender-equitable development and 
poverty reduction. But in order to achieve these goals, the institutions need to marry existing top-down 
policy guidance and resource flows with responsiveness to bottom-up demands for services, planning, and 
management, as well as the provision of appropriate capacity development and support, particularly at the 
local level. 
We proceed as follows. The next section discusses our conceptual framework, methodology, and 
data. We then discuss in turn the context of the issues we are exploring and the questions of quality, 
gender equity, and voice and accountability in agricultural extension service provision in our study sites. 
The final section provides our conclusions and recommendations. 3 
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper employs the conceptual framework developed by Birner et al. (2009) and reproduced in Figure 
2.1. It distinguishes between factors that constitute choice variables for policymakers concerned with 
agricultural extension services (such as the features of extension captured in the box AAS) and variables 
that either are difficult for them to change or go beyond their area of influence (such as the contextual 
factors in box CF), including gender roles. 
The governance, capacity, management, and delivery methods of the agricultural extension 
system—and the extent to which these factors constitute a best fit with Ethiopia’s existing policy 
environment, service provision capacity, agricultural systems, and sociocultural and economic 
conditions—in turn influence the quality of agricultural extension delivery (Box I). However, what is of 
ultimate interest is how the quality of extension contributes to outcomes related to development and well-
being. These may be defined more narrowly in terms of outcomes in the sector (such as agricultural 
productivity and incomes) or more broadly in terms of overall household income or consumption, gender 
equality, or empowerment (Box K). High performance in extension provision will not, however, result in 
improvement in these outcomes unless extension advice leads to appropriate changes in farmers’ 
agricultural practices by influencing their capacity, incentives, and knowledge base (Box J). In the rest of 
the paper, we will relate the overview information as well as the empirical findings back to this 
conceptual framework. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Prior to starting our research, we carried out a preliminary qualitative scoping exercise in Dejen district in 
December 2007. Subsequently, we carried out qualitative case studies in four additional districts in 
November and December 2008 (see Table 2.1). We purposively chose these four districts; the Oromia D-
BG D pairing includes a district government with responsibility for service provision and one where the 
regional government retains responsibility. In the case of the Amhara D-2-Tigray D pairing, both district 
governments have responsibility for service provision, but Amhara D-2 is part of a special zone that is 
home to the Agaw ethnic group. The zone has elected legislative and executive bodies, to which the 
district government reports. In some ways, governance in Amhara D-2 is akin to the arrangements in less 
decentralized districts such as BG D. In all five districts, we conducted key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions in the district capital town and one kebele,
1 based on interview guides that we prepared 
in advance. Altogether, we interviewed 105 informants, 45 in district capitals and 60 in the kebeles. Table 
2.1 also provides some background on the agroecology and degree of decentralized service delivery in 
each of the study districts. In the district capitals in the four main study districts, we interviewed the chief 
administrator and the district government officials responsible for finance and budget, agricultural 
extension, drinking water, and women’s affairs; the speaker of the district council; and leaders of the 
district women’s association, the cooperative union, and the governing party. In the kebeles, we 
interviewed agricultural extension agents; the kebele manager; the speaker of the kebele council; the 
kebele chairperson; members of the kebele cabinet responsible for agriculture, drinking water, and 
women’s affairs; leaders of the agricultural cooperative, the women’s association, and the governing 
party; members of the water and sanitation committee; and focus groups of male and female farmers.  
Table 2.1—Study areas, number and type of interviews, agricultural livelihoods, and degree of 
decentralization 
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1 A kebele (or tabia in the Tigray region) is a multivillage cluster, sometimes called a peasant association, or PA, in English. 
It is the lowest level administrative unit in Ethiopia. There are over 15,000 kebeles altogether, with an average population of 
1,500 people (Legesse 2009).  6 
In addition to carrying out key informant interviews and focus group discussions, the research 
team engaged in daily reflections on what we learned in order to identify patterns. The team also engaged 
in participant observation and interpretation of expressed attitudes, body language, and vocal tones 
employed by informants. We carefully reviewed all field notes to draw out patterns of institutional design 
and development, processes used by local government, and approaches to service delivery. We also drew 
on our own previous experience carrying out research on agricultural extension in Ethiopia and 
triangulated our findings with secondary data drawn from the literature on decentralization and service 
delivery in Ethiopia. Unless otherwise noted, Sections 4–6 are based on our interviews, observations, and 
reflections. 
The qualitative social science research methods that we employed are the ones most commonly 
used in institutional analysis of policymaking and program implementation (Mathauer 2004), and such 
methods provide nuance and depth (Patton 1990) to complement the quantitative community- and 
household-level survey research that the Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI) and the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) carried out in the study districts (other than Amhara 
D-1) and in four additional districts. Our case studies were the only component of the EEPRI–IFPRI 
research that focused on district-level institutions. 
We adopt North’s definition of institutions: “formal and informal rules, enforcement 
characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction through 
constraints, incentives, and enhancement” (1990, 131). As Mathauer points out, these “rules of the game” 
are not themselves organizations, but the human interactions that they shape “occur between individuals, 
within organizations, and between organizations” (2004, 8). 7 
4.  CONTEXT 
Political System 
Ethiopia is a federal republic, with five administrative tiers: federal, regional, zonal, district, and kebele. 
At the federal, regional, district, and kebele levels, and in some zones, governance institutions take a 
parliamentary form, with citizens electing councils that formally appoint executive and judicial bodies. 
Ostensibly, there is multiparty competition to fill all legislative seats. In practice, the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has dominated political life since taking power in 1991 
following a civil war. EPRDF affiliates, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), whose chair 
is the country’s current prime minister, are organized along Leninist lines,
2 although EPRDF policy 
advocates a mixed economy with a substantial role for both the state and market forces (Vaughan and 
Tronvoll 2003).  
The EPRDF government has organized political and administrative affairs according to a system 
of “ethnic federalism,” with the regions and certain zones constituting “national homelands” for particular 
ethnic groups. The current political system emerged in 1995 with the adoption of the constitution. The 
administrative structure consists of nine regions and two city administrations. There are EPRDF-affiliated 
parties in the four largest regions (Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, and the Southern Nations’, Nationalities’, 
and People’s Region), with allied parties that are not considered full-fledged EPRDF members in the five 
smaller regions. Following disputed elections at the federal and regional levels in 2005, and a period of 
suppression of dissent, the EPRDF won nearly all of the 3.6 million council seats in countrywide district 
and kebele council elections in 2008 after electoral officials disqualified many opposition party and 
independent candidates (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008). 
The EPRDF is pervasive in all policy matters, including agricultural development, and at all 
levels of governance (Aalen 2002; Pausewang, Tronvoll, and Aalen 2003; Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu 
2007). Civil society organizations, such as associations for women, youth, elders, and veterans, are 
basically party mass organizations (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). This is true even of farmer 
cooperatives: Members of EPRDF parties routinely fill cooperative leadership positions (Spielman, 
Cohen, and Mogues 2009). 
Thus, despite the existence of some opposition parties and the periodic holding of elections, in 
practice, the EPRDF has enjoyed uninterrupted control of the federal government since 1991, and through 
its affiliated and associated parties has similarly controlled all regional governments. Likewise, it has 
dominated nearly all local government councils throughout this period (Pausewang, Tronvoll, and Aalen 
2003; World Bank 2004; US Department of State 2009; Aalen and Tronvoll 2008). The country has 
received a low ranking for voice and accountability on the World Bank’s governance indicators, and the 
ranking declined from 1998 to 2007 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007, 2008). 
Administrative Units 
The kebele is the lowest formal unit of administration, but kebeles typically consist of four to seven 
villages. Villages are often a relevant unit for government initiatives and programs—notably agricultural 
extension and community mobilization. A yet smaller unit is the lemati budin, or development team.
3 
Lemati budin are collections of approximately 30 households, drawn on (through the team leaders) for the 
implementation of a range of government activities, including mobilizing household labor for community 
projects. They also have political functions, such as mobilizing votes for the ruling party. DAs often work 
closely with lemati budin. 
                                                       
2 According to its statute, the EPRDF and its affiliated parties follow the principle of democratic centralism (EPRDF 2006, 
section II.7, article 7e). This principle was first outlined by Lenin (1902). Party members and structures must adhere strictly to 
decisions the party has made. Members are subject to sanctions (including expulsion) if they break discipline.  
3 Previously called mengistawi budin, or government teams. 8 
Two Waves of Decentralization 
Historically, governance in Ethiopia has featured a unitary state and tight centralization. Decisions were 
made in the capital, Addis Ababa, and local officials served as mere implementing agents for the central 
authorities (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu 2007). 
The EPRDF has broken significantly with this governance tradition, engineering two significant 
waves of decentralization. In 1992, the EPRDF-dominated transitional government devolved significant 
administrative responsibilities to the regions. The federal and parallel regional constitutions firmly 
establish popular sovereignty, whereby leading governmental bodies at all administrative levels are 
subject to periodic elections, and provide citizens with access to services, the right to censure elected 
officials, and the right to participate in planning and budgeting decisions. This round of decentralization 
kept development of policy frameworks in the federal government’s hands but made the regions 
responsible for policy implementation, with substantial discretionary authority. Nevertheless, the first 
decentralization wave was characterized by ongoing fiscal dependence on the federal government. In 
practice, this limited regional governments’ actual exercise of discretion (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu 
2007; World Bank 2001). 
During 2001-2002, Ethiopia began an ambitious second wave of decentralization, with 
responsibility for many public goods and services, including agricultural extension, further devolved to 
district governments in the four most populous regions, in which 86 percent of Ethiopians live. This has 
entailed redeployment of civil servants to the districts, formal empowerment of district governments to 
hire and fire staff, and a substantial measure of autonomy in planning and budgeting. According to the 
federal government’s national development plan, “The devolution of power to regional states and then to 
the [district] is a centerpiece of Ethiopia’s strategy for ending poverty by improving accountability, 
responsibility, and flexibility in service delivery and increasing local participation in democratic 
decisionmaking on factors affecting the livelihood of the grassroots population” (Ethiopia, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development 2006, 184). 
However, the districts remain heavily dependent on the regional and federal governments for 
revenues, and total district government budget allocations are fixed according to formulas established at 
the higher levels. Moreover, allocations are reduced by the amount of additional revenues that districts 
may secure, for example, directly from donors (Dom and Mussa 2006a, 2006b). Also, while district 
governments in theory have discretion over the sectoral allocation of expenditures and the allocation of 
resources among their kebeles, they receive planning targets from regional governments that in practice 
are much more than indicative (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu 2007; Dom and Mussa 2006a, 2006b). 
The second wave of decentralization has brought governance closer to citizens and expanded 
voice and participation in decisionmaking. The process has sought to make the district governments into 
nodes in which bottom-up and top-down modes of planning and accountability meet and are harmonized. 
However, the combination of budget ceilings and strong planning guidance from above tends to trump 
these downward accountability processes. Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu observe that the omnipresence 
of the ruling party and its functionaries in all spheres and at all levels has made the organs to adhere to its 
organizational programs and preferences. In other words, the Ethiopian decentralization drive is centrally 
controlled in spite of the fact that it appears to be a form of political devolution. (2007, 48). As a result, 
they add, power is deconcentrated but not truly devolved, a point that is “corroborated by the fact that the 
ruling party that is prone to upward accountability dominates the entire realm of political governance at 
all levels” (2007, 49). 
Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu (2007) also find that decentralization alone has not altered unequal 
gender relations because cultural and religious factors continue to limit women’s access to resources, 
services, and power, as well as their participation in public affairs. Some 85 percent of Ethiopians practice 
culturally conservative interpretations of Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam that reinforce these 
mores. Women’s affairs offices at the regional, zonal, and district levels often lack formal linkages with 
sectoral offices (such as agricultural development offices), and the presence of women in elected bodies 
has not removed systematic gender bias from either society or governance structures. This requires more 9 
explicit and comprehensive efforts to achieve gender equality (2007). In addition, they write, there is as 
yet no “systematic study investigating improvements in women’s access to services and women’s 
involvement in decentralized structures and decisionmaking” (2007, 51).  
Recently, the federal government has taken some steps that could lead to further decentralization 
of service provision to the kebele level. Notably, it has deployed extension agents to the kebele. 
An important aspect of service provision throughout the country is mobilization of community 
labor and (sometimes financial) contributions. In most of the country these are treated as voluntary, 
although in practice they are mandatory. In the Tigray region, labor contributions are explicitly treated as 
compulsory. Labor contributions play an essential role in construction and maintenance of soil and water 
conservation works and roads, as well as in reforestation efforts (Dom and Mussa 2006a, 2006b). Too 
often, ostensibly participatory rural development programs in Ethiopia can be characterized as what we 
call stone-carrying participation. 
Agricultural Extension 
Agriculture is central to the federal government’s national development plan through the ADLI policy 
(Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 2006), and indeed, development and 
agriculture are often used as synonyms in Ethiopia. The share of public expenditures devoted to 
agriculture and natural resources was 21 percent in 2005, well above the Sub-Saharan African average of 
4 percent and more than double the African Union target of 10 percent (Mogues, Ayele, and Paulos 
2008). Nevertheless, at present most Ethiopian farmers do not use modern agricultural technology, and 
the innovation system (agricultural research, extension, and education) is poorly integrated (Lemma 
2007). 
To implement its ADLI strategy, in the 1990s the federal government commenced a big push to 
disseminate agricultural technology packages to farmers. These include fertilizer, improved seeds, credit, 
and the provision of extension services (EEA and EEPRI 2006). Within the decentralized administrative 
structure, the main government institutions responsible for the planning and implementation of 
agricultural policies and projects are the federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MoARD) and the corresponding regional bureaus and zonal and district offices. 
The government is the major provider of extension through the woreda (district) offices of 
agriculture and rural development (WoARDs). These generally include such subsectors as agricultural 
development, natural resources, environmental protection and land administration, water supply and rural 
roads, input supply and cooperative promotion, marketing, and disaster management and food security. 
Agricultural extension service provision falls under the agricultural development subsector and is further 
subdivided into extension on crops, livestock, and natural resources management (Gebremedhin, 
Hoekstra, and Tegegne 2006; Cohen, Rocchigiani, and Garrett 2008). 
The second wave of decentralization gave district governments in the four largest regions 
responsibility for providing rural services, including extension. In the case of extension, until 2006, each 
kebele had access to the services of a single DA based in the WoARD. Selected kebeles were able to draw 
on a larger extension team under specialized projects such as the MERET (Managing Environmental 
Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods) soil and water conservation project 
supported by the World Food Programme (Cohen, Rocchigiani, and Garrett 2008). WoARDs also have 
more highly trained specialists who can provide services as needed to address specific problems. As part 
of its extensive good governance reform in the wake of the disputed 2005 elections (Dom and Mussa 
2006a, 2006b), the federal government directed all districts in the four largest regions to expand extension 
services dramatically, posting a team of at least three extension agents, with training in crops, livestock, 
and natural resource management, respectively, in every kebele. The agents rotate to new communities 
every few years and remain accountable to the WoARD. In some cases there are additional extension 
agents, such as those who specialize in beekeeping, veterinary health, cooperatives, or other topics; where 
they are present they each usually serve multiple kebeles. 10 
The literature on agricultural extension in Ethiopia emphasizes the top-down approach to 
extension service provision. DAs have received relatively hard quotas for enrolling farmers in technology 
packages, and their supervisors evaluate them on the basis of how well they meet these quotas. Extension 
also works through “model” or “progressive” farmers, who tend to be better off and male. 
Communication is mostly one-way, with agents transferring knowledge to farmers. There is little effort to 
marry new agricultural research and development with farmers’ own knowledge or to learn what kind of 
services farmers themselves would like to receive (Buchy and Basaznew 2005; EAA and EEPRI 2006; 
Lemma 2007). Most agents have been men, except in the field of home economics, and have provided 
services mainly to heads of household, regardless of gender (Buchy and Basaznew 2005; EAA and 
EEPRI 2006). Historically, extension policy was made in Addis Ababa and merely implemented in the 
field. Changing the delivery mode can have positive benefits: Deployment of extension teams to kebeles 
can facilitate communities’ ability to plan and manage development activities for themselves on a 
sustainable basis (Cohen, Rocchigiani, and Garrett 2008). Extension services generally have positive 
impacts on nutrition and poverty reduction (Dercon et al. 2009).  
Role of Women in Agriculture 
The gender division of agricultural activities has constrained women’s access to extension services. 
Horticultural production and the raising of poultry and small ruminants has been considered a part of 
home economics—the domain of women—until quite recently, leaving women excluded from other kinds 
of extension advice, training, and credit.  
Both the federal constitution and all regional land proclamations stipulate that the existing land 
rights are to be granted equally to men and women. Empirical evidence, however, reveals important 
gender asymmetries in de facto access to and control over land, particularly via inheritance (Fafchamps 
and Quisumbing 2005). Even in regions where women (whether household heads or not) formally receive 
individual rights to use land, land tenure security continues to be precarious for women (Crewett, Bogale, 
and Korf 2008). In the Oromia region, for example, tenure insecurity prevails for divorced women. Some 
articles in Oromia’s land proclamation link land rights to social status, which in effect constrains the 
rights of divorced women and widows. This is consistent with the finding of Fafchamps and Quisumbing 
(2005) that it is mostly husbands who keep the land upon dissolution of the marriage union.  
Strategies to Promote Gender Equality 
Table 3.1 presents gender-related indicators derived from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) database. These indicators present 
a mixed picture. The first four indicators all rate various levels of gender equality and sensitivity on a 
scale from 0 to 1, with a 0 score representing full equality or the highest level of sensitivity, and a score of 
1 representing absolute discrimination or absence of sensitivity. Ethiopia has low ratings on violence 
against women and women’s access to land, but in fact has made strides in including women in land 
titling programs. The freedom of movement indicator reveals that women have full freedom of movement 
outside of the home. The rating on women’s access to bank loans represents a lending climate halfway 
between full possibility and impossibility for women to secure loans. With regard to national-level 
political participation, Ethiopia’s parliament reports that women fill 22 percent of the seats, high 
compared to some other developing countries. The gender, institutions, and development index measures 
gender inequality in four areas of social institutions—family code, physical integrity, civil liberties, and 
ownership rights. 
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Source: OECD 2011. 
Notes: 0 represents full equality or gender sensitivity, 1 represents maximum discrimination or absence of gender sensitivity. 
To address the problem of gender inequality in Ethiopian society, the federal government has 
implemented a range of strategies. It introduced the National Policy on Women (NPW) for Ethiopia in 
1993 and enshrined gender equality in the 1995 constitution. The NPW mandates legal equality and equal 
access to services for rural women. It is also intended to create the appropriate structures within 
government offices to establish and monitor the implementation of different gender-sensitive and 
equitable public policies. National action plans on gender equality, adopted in 2000 and 2006 respectively 
(Ethiopia, Ministry of Women’s Affairs 2000, 2006), include steps to enhance rural women’s access to 
and control over productive resources such as land, credit, and extension services. 
At the various tiers of government there are now ministries, bureaus, and offices of women’s 
affairs. The federal ministry is mainly responsible for conducting and monitoring women’s affairs 
activities at the national level and creating the environment for the implementation of the NPW in 
different sectors. At the regional, zonal, district, and kebele level, there are respective bureaus and offices 
of women’s affairs (in the case of the kebele, a single cabinet officer). As in the case of other line bureaus 
and offices, the women’s affairs bureaus and offices are formally accountable to their respective councils, 
many of which have a women’s affairs or social affairs committee that engages in oversight. 
In addition to these agencies, in several of the sector or line ministries there are departments, 
desks, or individual “focal points” focusing on gender issues concerning the respective sector. These exist 
from the federal to the district level and are mandated to investigate gender gaps and develop strategies to 
address inequalities in the line ministries and their subsectors respectively (AfDB 2004).  
The MoARD women’s affairs department acts as a gender focal point in the ministry. At regional 
bureaus of agriculture and rural development (BoARDs), gender focal points liaise with the respective 
women’s affairs bureaus. In the same way, at the district level gender desks are set up in the WoARD. In 
such a system that is organized to penetrate the grassroots level, agricultural service provision, such as 
extension, is supposed to be delivered to both men and women in an equitable way. 
Spring and Groelsema (2004) note that district governments are supposed to carry out gender 
budgeting in order to hold public spending activities accountable to principles of gender equality. 
However, there is no information on the ground concerning the extent to which gender budgeting in fact 
has been implemented. There are only some initiatives to develop sectoral gender budgeting guidelines 
(for example, in education and in finance and economic development). The capacity to mainstream 
gender budgeting at the local government levels is quite limited.  
The EPRDF has incorporated within its statutes the participation of women through the formation 
of a women’s league to work for the implementation of its strategies of development and also to serve as 
“an agent of struggle to free Ethiopian women from all kinds of oppressions” (EPRDF 2006).  
Buchy and Basaznew (2005) found crucial shortcomings both in the gender sensitivity of 
extension provision and in the way gender and women’s affairs were situated within the bureaucracy in 
the Awasa Bureau of Agriculture. While farmers in general were underserved by extension agents, 
   Measure  Ethiopia 
Violence against women  Score 0–1
a)  0.8 
Freedom of movement   Score 0–1
a)  0 
Women’s access to land   Score 0–1
a)  0.7 
Women’s access to bank 
loans  Score 0–1
a)  0.5 
Women in parliament   % of total  22% 
Gender, institutions, and 
development index 
Rank  
(out of 117)  86 12 
women farmers made up only a small fraction of farmers receiving extension services. They seldom went 
to extension field visits unless these were related to home economics. Even where training by agricultural 
staff was in principle open to men and women farmers, the training times were selected without 
consideration of women’s time burdens. The NPW points to the challenge inherent in the way that 
traditional social norms filter into bureaucracies, leading to a resistance within these bureaucracies to 
consider gender experts in agencies as being on par with other officials (Ethiopia, Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs 2000). Within a given agency, the major push to foster gender awareness stems from donors. Yet 
Buchy and Basaznew (2005) found that the Awasa BoARD had no gender policy and therefore no 
gender-specific guidelines or procedures. Its unit responsible for gender outreach had the characteristics 
of many similar gender desks in line ministries: All staff were women, it had a precarious position within 
the bureau, it was heavily specialized in home economics and nutrition, it was short on other core skills 
such as project planning and preparation, it operated mostly in isolation from the rest of the bureaucracy, 
and it had no mandate to monitor the gender-related performance of the bureau. 
Unlike commonly found trends in many countries, in Ethiopia gender representation in 
government does not consistently decrease with the level or tier of government. For example, as of 2004, 
women represented 8 percent, 13 percent, 7 percent, and 14 percent of the federal, regional, district, and 
kebele parliaments or councils, respectively (Ethiopia, Prime Minister’s Office, Women’s Affairs Sub-
sector 2004). This pattern, however, masks substantial regional variation in women’s presence in 
subnational government structures, reflecting the highly disparate role of women in different regions; for 
example, women’s share in regional councils ranged between 1 percent in Somale region and 28 percent 
in Tigray region in 2005 (IFAD 2005). Women representatives on councils have limited capacity to effect 
transformation of long-held attitudes on gender and the institutions and structures that perpetuate such 
attitudes.  
A detailed analysis of the NPW warned that decentralization could weaken the government’s 
ability to effectively implement the 1993 policy, in light of more limited capacity at the district and kebele 
levels to translate the policy into investments and programs (Ethiopia Women’s Affairs Office and World 
Bank 1998). There are no formal quotas to ensure a degree of representation of women among the 
government’s electoral bodies, as found in some developing and developed countries. The constitution 
does not mandate representation of women in political office, although there are mandates for certain 
ethnic minorities (Demessie, Kebede, and Shimeles 2005). At the same time, the constitution also does 
not bar the use of affirmative action measures to reduce gender inequality, and it has been proposed to 
employ such measures to strengthen women’s presence in local councils, thereby beginning to overcome 
the absence of women’s voice at least in government representative bodies (Ethiopia Women’s Affairs 
Office and World Bank 1998). 
At the local level, gender representation among elected representatives reflects the 
“ghettoization” of women in women’s affairs units, similar to the staffing of the agricultural bureaucracy 
described above. As Dom and Mussa (2006a) found in a study of the Amhara region, in standing 
committees of the district council—which were formed around topics such as economic affairs, budget 
and finance, legal and administrative affairs, and the like—women were hardly represented, except on the 
standing committees for women’s affairs, which consisted entirely of women. The district cabinet 
typically includes only a single woman, who heads the Office of Women’s Affairs. 
Aside from the local government positions focused on gender—women’s affairs officials and 
units within the kebele and district cabinets, and women’s affairs standing committees in the district 
councils—there are also women’s associations at the community level, and these are officially considered 
nongovernmental entities. In fact, women’s associations, along with youth associations, exist at every 
level of administration, from the kebele on up. Their role and effectiveness vary by region. While in 
Tigray, women’s associations tend to be quite important and well organized, in Amhara their strength and 
effectiveness, and thus their credibility, are constrained, especially at the lower levels, by limited 
resources to initiate activities and provide services to their members (Dom and Mussa 2006a). The size 
and vigor of membership in women’s associations is also likely to be compromised by a perception on the 
part of residents that despite their formally nongovernmental status, they are an appendage of the 13 
government and in particular of the ruling party, discouraging regular women farmers from greater 
participation in this institution (Muir 2004). 
While in Ethiopia there is a stark discrepancy between formal procedures for local development 
planning under decentralization on the one hand and the reality and practice of the planning process on 
the other hand (Dom and Mussa 2006a; Yilmaz and Venugopal 2008), the participation of women in 
community planning and decisionmaking has been found to be nearly nonexistent. A World Bank (2001) 
study of decentralization and service delivery in four regions found several cultural, social, and economic 
barriers to women’s ability to attend community meetings and to express their priorities and concerns 
when they did attend. A fear of violent reprisal from husbands, feelings of insecurity about public 
speaking, a sense that their opinions would not be listened to, and pressure on their time all combined to 
keep both attendance and expression of voice low. On the other hand, perhaps due to pressure from 
donors or higher-tier governments to create more gender balance in local meetings, it was found that for 
local government planning meetings, women were at times “ordered” to attend (World Bank 2001). 14 
5.  QUALITY OF SERVICE PROVISION 
In this section we discuss the efficiency, effectiveness, and client orientation of extension services in the 
study districts. By efficiency, we mean the extent to which resource use is optimal. Resources include 
time, labor, local knowledge, modern technology, money, and natural resources. Whether their use is 
optimal depends in part on the systems, processes, and institutions that employ the resources. 
Participatory development requires use of the knowledge, capacity, institutions, and power of the affected 
people. It must also be useful. People are not merely beneficiaries but crucial development actors. Local 
knowledge is the basis for community participation. Communities participate in what they know, and 
what they know well is their knowledge and practices. Even if a development activity achieves its overall 
goals, it is not efficient if it fails to utilize local and community knowledge.  
Effectiveness refers to the degree to which development policies, programs, and projects meet 
their stated goals and objectives. Extension services are effective if they succeed in facilitating 
community development, rural poverty reduction, gender equality, and agricultural development that 
spurs growth and linkages to industrialization. The effectiveness of extension services is to be seen in the 
knowledge and skills of farmers in solving their own problems. Institutional pluralism and farmer 
participation are important conditions for effective extension services.  
We characterize service provision as client oriented if the expressed desires and assessed needs of 
the people to whom services are provided drive the methods and processes. A client-oriented extension 
service is participatory when it provides farmers with information, advice, and training in a wide range of 
areas yet ultimate decisionmaking remains with the farmers. In addition, client-oriented extension 
services require that farmers be well organized and have the capacity to articulate their demands and 
control the system. The mind-set of respect for public service providers is deep-rooted in Ethiopian 
society. The administrative and political culture does not favor a client orientation or participation, 
transparency, and accountability. The administrative and political system is very hierarchical, 
characterized by command and control. As we were told by the head of the planning desk at the BG D 
Office of Finance and Economic Development, government officials are out to advance themselves, not to 
serve the people. Even when district officials are competent, as in Amhara D-2 and Oromia D, they have 
no commitment and incentives to advance people and reduce poverty. There is high demand for services 
in the kebeles, but too often the supply is not forthcoming.  
Efficiency 
Recent governance reform initiatives in Ethiopia are intended to provide an enabling environment for 
improving the scale, efficiency, and responsiveness of public service delivery and for empowering 
citizens to participate more successfully in shaping their own development. These initiatives, coupled 
with social accountability projects, are expected to improve the efficiency of public service provision. For 
this to happen, it is essential that DAs gain farmers’ acceptance and confidence in their objectivity, and 
that farmers not perceive DAs as having conflicting interests from their own (Lemma 2007). The 
willingness and ability of DAs to accept ideas and criticism from farmers and respect local knowledge are 
vital for successful extension.  
The rapid expansion of the extension service since 2005 has increased the number of DAs who 
hold postsecondary diplomas. In all of our study kebeles except Lugoboka we found a team of at least 
three DAs present, and all held diplomas. This indicates that extension services are available but does not 
tell us anything about service quality, which is a question of effectiveness. The ultimate test of extension 
services is to be found in the extent to which they have increased farmers’ knowledge, skills, and 
innovative capacities.  
In addition, the rapid scaling up of extension has opened up opportunities for women to fill 
positions. We interviewed female agents with specialized training in crops, livestock, and natural resource 
management; this is a change from the past, when the few women DAs were heavily concentrated in 
home economics and nutrition.  15 
The existence of capacity-building and backstopping institutions is vital to advance agricultural 
development. Recently, farmer training centers (FTCs) have been established in many kebeles; DAs train 
farmers at these sites through the use of both classrooms and demonstration fields. The FTCs have 
demonstration farms where new technologies are tested and adapted and where farmers learn about the 
use of new improved technology packages. The government’s goal is to eventually establish one FTC per 
kebele. 
DAs and other agriculture staff, in turn, receive training through Ethiopia’s 25 agricultural, 
technical, and vocational education and training (ATVET) colleges. However, the emphasis is on 
technical subjects, with inadequate focus on social issues, gender analysis, and community mobilization. 
Extension personnel with more advanced training tend to work in administrative and supervisory 
positions (Lemma 2007). 
We found that kebele-based extension teams are now deploying on a watershed basis, with each 
member taking responsibility for all agricultural advice within her or his territory, and drawing on the 
technical expertise of colleagues as needed. This integrated approach to extension mirrors farmers’ own 
sense of integration. The team meets frequently and reports to supervisors who are likewise deployed to a 
kebele and take responsibility for teams in a cluster of three or four surrounding kebeles. The team 
members work closely with contact and model farmers and lemati budin in their respective territories, and 
facilitate kebele-level agricultural planning. This is an efficient use of resources in that each DA works 
with a manageable number of farmers and can draw on help from other team members, supervisors, and 
district-based experts when necessary. However, the approach does not optimize the use of the DAs’ 
technical training, since each agent becomes a generalist within her or his territory. 
Tigray D offered the best-case scenario among our study districts. The district government has 
more than 100 university-trained staff. DAs do not have problems accessing the kebeles and have 
adequate mobility. There are at least three DAs per kebele, and they have received additional training 
from NGOs, including training on gender issues. The district has good roads and irrigation infrastructure, 
which provide incentives for commercial farming. Kebeles have good teamwork and relations with the 
district government. In Tigray K, the DAs are well trained and motivated, have in-service training 
opportunities, have good analytical capacity, and work closely with the lemati budin in their respective 
territories. The extension team prepares weekly plans together and rotates in sections of the kebele. The 
commonly used extension method is individual visits to farmers or homes. The agents are very efficient 
and also effective. In some kebeles, there are five or more DAs, including veterinary specialists, 
beekeeping technicians, cooperative promotion agents, and water technicians. There are incentives for 
good performance from both the farmers and the district government. This shows that, at a minimum, 
DAs meet the expressed needs and demands of farmers, who have a means for rewarding good DAs.  
However, we did note some suboptimal use of human resources in Tigray K. Two recently 
trained DAs were offered non-DA jobs in the kebele. A woman was employed in a lower-paid technician 
position although she had training as a full-fledged extension agent. A man received the position of kebele 
manager, the chief local civil servant. We do not have enough information to determine whether gender 
discrimination operated in deciding who received which post, and based on our observations and 
interviews, both of the people in question seemed capable and well regarded in the community.  
In Amhara D-2, Oromia D, and BG D, the efficiency of agricultural service provision is reduced 
due to ecological, technical, and social factors. In both Amhara D-2 and Oromia D, DAs complain about 
the lack of opportunities for in-service training, even via distance learning. In Amhara D-2, the 
administrative culture is a barrier to development. Kebele-based DAs understand the problems and needs 
of farmers, but they lack discretion and adequate technical support from district experts, whose 
relationship with them is merely one of control. In Amhara K-2, the DA team leader is well trained and 
has a very good sense of local social and political issues as well as the agroecology of the kebele. But he 
commented on the lack of follow-up from supervisors, who have no greater technical knowledge than the 
members of the extension team (one DA said that “they are no better than us” technically). Supervisors 
perform only control functions, such as making sure that DAs meet their quotas for enrolling farmers into 
extension packages. 16 
In Amhara K-2, we heard of a woman who had recently received DA training and became the 
kebele manager, but quit after a short time. In this situation, it seemed that difficult working conditions 
due to the agroecology as well as having to work with long-tenured male local elected officials may have 
been factors in her departure. We observed some of the planning tools she had tried to develop before 
leaving, including a map and census of the community.  
In Oromia K, there is an FTC, but it is not utilized for extension work. It lacks proper fencing and 
is used as a goat shed. The kebele has a resident extension team, but supervisors do not visit them 
regularly. There are only five model farmers in the kebele, and they receive inadequate extension support. 
As a result, there are few demonstration effects to induce other farmers to adopt the same improved 
practices.  
In BG D, extension services are somewhere between inefficient and nonexistent. Decentralization 
has not yet taken place; the district government engages in some planning but mostly implements 
initiatives coming from the region. The district also lacks adequate human resources; zonal experts 
provide technical support in planning and budget functions. None of the district government staff has 
completed secondary school. There is also a mobility problem due to lack of vehicles and motorcycles. 
Only two kebeles have development centers with FTCs, and these are completely nonfunctional. In BG K 
the center provides only basic veterinary service, but the facility does not have refrigeration for animal 
medications. DAs are concentrated in the district capital and kebeles have limited access to their services. 
At best, the agents visit kebeles every two or three weeks. There are no kebele-based extension teams and 
supervisors. The DAs lack both technical agricultural and social mobilization skills. There are high rates 
of absenteeism and turnover due to the difficult working conditions in the district. Only 1 of 30 district 
agricultural experts specializes in natural resource management, despite the importance of forest-based 
livelihoods in the district. The district also does not provide credit to help farmers adopt technology 
packages. 
Effectiveness 
Extension service is a key instrument to achieve the goals of agricultural development policies and 
programs. In some places, it is more effective than in others. Tigray D has high potential, adequate human 
capacity, good infrastructure, market integration, and good moisture and soil fertility. Extension performs 
well and helps residents to realize the potential that is available. In the district, institutional arrangements 
and people’s participation in making agriculture advance are both fairly mature. Farmers understand 
change and cooperate with DAs and administrators to enhance their livelihoods. They are receptive to 
outside information and are supported and encouraged to develop their own knowledge systems and 
practices. Farmers are open and entrepreneurial, and they take advantage of opportunities and a good 
enabling environment. A critical mass of model farmers engages in irrigated commercial agriculture and 
enjoys good links to markets, including those in urban centers such as Mekele, Maichew, Alamata, and 
Korem, which are accessible via all-weather, paved roads. As a result, these farmers see their 
socioeconomic status improve. Opportunities are open to women as well as men. The DA team supports 
these farmers’ market-oriented activities. At all levels, there is strong commitment to change, and service 
providers effectively meet demand for services. There is also healthy competition among different kebeles 
as an incentive for good performance by DAs, their supervisors, and the kebele administrations. The 
district organizes experience-sharing programs among various kebeles to facilitate learning about good 
practices. DAs respect farmers’ own knowledge; selected farmer practices are now included in the 
extension package and are being promoted in similar contexts.  
BG D offers a sharp contrast. DAs are very ineffective in meeting the needs of farmers. They lack 
motivation to provide high-quality services. The veterinary service agent is not well trained and has no 
social interaction or open discussions with farmers about the constraints that they face. She fails to make 
sure that farmers carry out the full course of treatment for cattle. This constrains the effectiveness of her 
advice. People will not pay for medicine and do not use veterinary services even when livestock diseases 
break out, because the agent has failed to persuade them of the value of the treatment. The agent’s lack of 17 
follow-up and dialogue with the farmers reduces the demonstration effect of the farmers who do use the 
treatment. Ineffective training leads to ineffective service. 
Oromia D is similar to BG D in topography. A lack of roads and transportation facilities makes 
extension supervision difficult, so DAs do not receive much guidance on working with farmers. Farmers’ 
demand for services is high, however. In Oromia K, women hear  about development programs elsewhere 
on the radio and then seek similar services in their community. As in Tigray D, the DAs know the local 
situation well, but they do not get the same support from district technical experts. Farmers are willing to 
innovate and commercialize their enterprises, but input delivery is not timely and adequate. Also, the cost 
of inputs was rising at the time of the research. The potential for coffee production is high, and farmers 
are willing to grow it, but cultivation was just getting underway. Budget limitations constrain provision of 
support services that could facilitate coffee expansion. In addition, there is no budget for roads, and this 
limits both marketing and input delivery. Farmers use donkeys to transport supplies from the district 
town. The district cooperatives have to rent storage space in the district capital.  
In Amhara K-2, the agroecological situation is a bottleneck to agricultural diversification. There 
is virtually no possibility to engage in high-input, irrigated agriculture. There is good potential for 
livestock, especially goats and bees, but this is poorly exploited. Farmers are not well organized into 
specialized livestock and honey cooperatives. DAs only sporadically provide relevant services to farmers, 
such as modern beehives and advice on honey extraction. Farmers also face difficulty marketing honey 
due to poor roads. Uncertain conditions make farmers reluctant to innovate; they cannot take risks with 
high-input technologies since they have no insurance. The district government is not tailoring 
development packages to realize the potential of Amhara D-2. Instead, its development approach is top-
down and based on practices more appropriate to higher-potential areas such as neighboring Tigray D. As 
a result, residents do not enjoy sustainable livelihoods. As a DA puts it, “Only the Safety Net Program,” a 
government program providing cash and food to poor people, “keeps people here.” 
The Amhara D-2 government does not provide added technical value to DAs and does not 
empower them to help farmers by building on local knowledge, even though the DAs know how to 
promote rural development and support farmers. There is not much backing from the kebele cabinet 
either. Planning is top-down and does not reflect local conditions and potential; there are no links to the 
nearby agricultural research station, and FTCs are dysfunctional. The point of extension is to facilitate 
people’s ability to build their capacity to solve their own problems. Because they are based in the kebele, 
the DAs have gained an understanding of local problems and socioeconomic and cultural realities, and 
could help farmers with problem solving. The problem is the attitude of district experts and supervisors, 
whose priority is quota-based package promotion. But the recruitment of young people, including women, 
into the ranks of the DAs may shake the system up a little. 
Client Orientation 
Recently, the extension system has shown improvements in meeting the expressed needs of farmers. DAs 
are better trained, and their deployment to the kebeles is an important institutional innovation that has 
given them understanding of local realities. The job of a DA is almost exclusively technical in orientation, 
with little or no emphasis on social mobilization, developing relationships with service users, facilitating 
farmer empowerment, or gender analysis. But by being posted in kebeles, DAs do gain some on-the-job 
training in these areas. In Tigray D, Amhara D-2, and Oromia D, DAs have good rapport with farmers 
and understand their needs and concerns. In Amhara K-2, a DA told us that he understood local farmers’ 
constraints and had the capacity to help them overcome problems, but the top-down nature of the 
district’s extension approach precluded him from providing tailored services.  
In Tigray D, both male and female farmers are satisfied with DA services. The DAs interact 
closely with farmers. Farmers appreciate the excellent services and hard work of the female beekeeping 
technician in Tigray K and allow her to stay in their homes. We observed that the DAs in Tigray K wear 
the same clothing as the local farmers even though some of them have urban backgrounds, and the female 18 
DAs in this Muslim community cover their heads as the local women do. The DAs hold open discussions 
with the community and enjoy the trust of the farmers whom they serve.  
BG D is the polar opposite of Tigray D with regard to farmer satisfaction. DAs do not seek 
farmers out to develop relationships based on trust and rapport. Farmers seldom receive services and are 
dissatisfied. But since the DAs seldom visit and do not solicit farmers’ views, there is no outlet for 
expressing demands. 19 
6.  GENDER EQUITY IN SERVICE PROVISION 
Gender equity refers to fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits—including agricultural 
extension services—and responsibilities between women and men. The concept recognizes that women 
and men have different needs and power and that these differences should be identified and addressed 
with different approaches to produce outcomes that are equitable. Equity involves fairness in 
representation, participation, and benefits afforded to women and men. Whereas gender equality is an 
outcome—in which males and females have equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities—gender 
equity encompasses the processes used to achieve that outcome.  
We found two main efforts to ensure gender equity in extension service provision: efforts to 
target women as extension users and the existence of gender machinery in the district and kebele 
administrations, that is, the creation of special institutions aimed at achieving a fair distribution of 
benefits. 
Targeting Services to Women 
We observed substantial institutional barriers to women farmers in obtaining access to extension services. 
In Amhara K-1, where we carried out our initial scoping study, a male DA told us that he only provides 
advice to heads of household; in husband–wife households, the husband is invariably considered the head. 
In advising such households, he said, he provides advice to the husband, even on women’s activities such 
as home gardening and poultry raising. He relies on the husband to then pass the advice on to his wife. 
This DA also told us that he provides direct advice to women who are heads of household. However, a 
female household head in Amhara K-1 told us that the local DAs only come to see her when it is time for 
her to contribute labor to maintenance of community soil and water conservation works. 
Elsewhere, DAs face cultural barriers in advising women farmers, since local customs may 
prevent married women from interacting with men other than their husbands. To circumvent this barrier, 
male DAs employ various approaches such as getting a husband’s permission to talk to his wife, working 
with local women’s organizations to arrange group extension meetings of women, and meeting with 
women during coffee ceremonies and other community gatherings. In both Amhara D-2 and Oromia D, 
DAs rarely hold extension meetings with women. In Amhara K-2, DAs work with women through 
village-level women’s groups and the kebele women’s association to get women enrolled in newer 
extension packages specifically targeted to women farmers. Women’s organization leaders in Amhara K-
2 told us that DAs do not proactively approach women but will provide advice to women if asked to do 
so. However, throughout the country, DAs are under pressure from their supervisors to enroll women in 
tailored extension packages, so contact with female farmers is likely to increase.  
We heard complaints that extension approaches do not differentiate between married women on 
the one hand and single female household heads on the other. At several study sites, we heard that even 
when female household heads have access to land, they frequently lack other productive resources such as 
labor, oxen, and credit, making it difficult to work the land themselves and obtain inputs. As a result, they 
frequently must sharecrop out their land and usually do so from a weak bargaining position that results in 
unfavorable arrangements. Extension advice generally does not address these obstacles. 
In addition, the Women’s Development and Change extension package emphasizes extension 
advice on traditional women’s activities such as home gardens and poultry. However, as a women’s 
association leader in Amhara K-2 told us, it is quite difficult for many female household heads to raise 
poultry because they spend a lot of their time trying to earn income through providing weeding services to 
other farmers. Typically, only those female household heads with older children have the time and labor 
to devote to chickens. In addition to the perception bias that women do not farm, there is thus a bias that 
all women can garden and tend chickens.  
The offices of women’s affairs and district women’s associations in Tigray D and Amhara D-2 
provide support to women’s organizations and the cabinet women’s affairs directors in the kebeles. The 
programs aim at enhancing rural women’s voice and economic empowerment. Among other things, the 20 
district programs help local institutions provide access to credit, vegetable seeds, and income-generation 
programs. The WoARDs in these districts also help women gain access to credit through the federal 
Productive Safety Net Program. In Oromia D, the WoARD supports women’s home gardening and 
microenterprise activities. The BG D government does not have any initiatives targeted toward women. 
Gender Machinery 
The governments of all of our study districts have an office of women’s affairs. These agencies seek to 
ensure gender equity in district budgets, plans, and programs, and they work closely with staff assigned as 
gender focal points or gender desk officers in sectoral offices. Parallel to this system, our study kebeles all 
had a cabinet member responsible for women’s affairs. Usually this official was the only woman sitting 
on the cabinet. In district and kebele cabinets, women tend to be pigeonholed into women’s positions such 
as women’s affairs, health, and education rather than security, finance, and agriculture. 
District Institutions 
We found the district-level gender machinery to be of varying degrees of effectiveness. In Tigray D, the 
Office of Women’s Affairs has highly trained and competent staff. The deputy head of the office told us 
that gender is mainstreamed in district sectoral planning, program implementation, and evaluation. The 
office monitors sectoral plans and reports through a gender lens, and works closely with the district 
women’s association. The office also trains sectoral senior managers in gender mainstreaming. The 
district women’s association has collaborated with ActionAid on gender awareness training for civil 
servants, including those deployed to the kebeles. In our view, the district administration is a model for 
gender-sensitive approaches to development. 
In contrast, the district government in Amhara D-2 makes at best half-hearted use of its gender 
machinery. Clearly, the district administration was told that such machinery needed to exist, but it does 
not seem to function. There are gender focal points in all the sectoral offices, but these are staff who have 
taken on this responsibility on top of other duties. When we met with two of them, they could not explain 
their duties to us and told us that they received no training on how to carry those duties out. Invariably, 
gender focal points are women, since senior government executives assume that gender equals women.  
In Oromia D, the situation is even worse. The Office of Women’s Affairs has a staff composed of 
school teachers whom the district has transferred into gender jobs because they are women. They receive 
no training beyond their teacher training, and the office has only a minimal budget. There are no focal 
points in sectoral offices, except for education (because the Women’s Affairs officials all come from the 
education sector). In theory, the office develops checklists to mainstream gender issues into sectoral 
planning, but it is difficult to see how it gets sectoral offices to use these lists in the absence of a formal 
liaison system and in light of open gender bias among the district government leadership. The district 
party leader has criticized the administration for its poor performance on gender equity.  
The BG D government had only recently established its Office of Women’s Affairs at the time of 
the research. It had no staff, budget, or programs. 
Kebele Institutions 
In both Tigray K and Amhara K-2, we found charismatic women serving in the position of cabinet 
director of women’s affairs. These officials worked closely with the local women’s association and the 
party women’s organization, and sought to expand the space available for women to meet, discuss issues, 
and work together.  
In general, however, we found that kebele administrations had little awareness of gender issues 
and did not provide support for women’s economic or political empowerment. Kebele leaders simply 
reported statistics on the number of women in political positions when asked about these issues. They 
could not speak to the quality of women’s participation or capacity development. In Oromia K, the local 
women’s affairs cabinet position was clearly considered a token one: The incumbent did not speak the 21 
local language or attend meetings, but she received the job because she is the only educated woman in the 
kebele and is married to the chairperson. 
The DAs themselves form part of the kebele gender machinery to the extent that they seek to 
achieve gender equity. We specifically asked female farmers and leaders of women’s organizations if 
they preferred to work with female DAs. In all study sites, we were told that the gender of the DA is less 
important than whether he or she pays attention to gender issues when providing services. In Tigray K, 
the women’s affairs director of the kebele cabinet singled out both male and female DAs as giving good 
advice to women farmers.  
Likewise, male farmers did not express any unwillingness to seek advice from female DAs. Both 
women and men farmers had high regard for the two women members of the extension team in Tigray K; 
we were told that both these women worked extremely hard and provided outstanding services. In BG K, 
although farmers complained about the ineffective advice that the female DA provided, their complaints 
did not involve her gender. Generally, we found BG D to have the least patriarchal attitudes of our study 
sites, as the local Gumuz culture is more gender-equitable and open. 22 
7.  VOICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN SERVICE PROVISION 
The literature on decentralization in Ethiopia indicates that placing responsibility for service delivery 
closer to the users has not substantially changed the traditional emphasis on upward accountability in 
public administration. This is due to both the federal government’s disinclination to couple administrative 
decentralization with fiscal decentralization and the pervasiveness of the EPRDF at all levels of 
governance (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu 2007). Our findings in the study districts and communities are 
very much consistent with this view. 
The governments in these districts remain completely dependent on the regions and especially the 
federal government for revenues, which are provided through formula-driven block grants that do not take 
local problems or concerns into account. Moreover, while districts do develop plans that have some 
influence on how those revenues get spent, regional bodies evaluate the district governments on their 
performance vis-à-vis the planning targets that they receive from the regions. In the case of BG D, 
decentralization to the district level has not occurred, so the district simply implements plans received 
from the region without any discretion. 
For their part, the kebele administrations have no role in developing budgets, and their planning 
processes tend to be symbolic. In the decentralized regions, district governments are supposed to serve as 
a hub that harmonizes bottom-up planning conducted at the community level with directives received 
from the higher levels of government. In practice, however, kebele efforts to identify priorities too often 
get lost in the shuffle to aggregate district plans and harmonize them with regional and federal guidance. 
While representatives of a particular kebele in the district council can argue for more resources, the 
district executive has a fixed budget pie, and so there is a zero-sum quality to how it sizes the slices. 
The pervasive influence of the EPRDF is evident in all the study districts. In Oromia D, the 
district cabinet is a mixed party and government body, without any pretense at separation. In Amhara D-
2, we saw party manuals on display in both district and zone government offices. Everywhere, 
government planning and program implementation conform with party directives, and civil servants 
invariably are party members. Even when party leaders are well attuned to local development issues, the 
system does not allow them to address local needs outside the parameters of party policy. The party 
evaluates civil servants and elected officials at all levels of government as to how well they carry out 
party directives. 
We encountered the top-down character of EPRDF governance even in the language employed. 
In Amhara D-2, the party public affairs director told us, “The party is the father of the community.” In 
other words, the role of the party is to be a parent and lead; the role of the people and community is that 
of children who need to be led. 
All of this impinges significantly on extension service provision at the kebele level. With the 
move to post DAs in the kebeles, agents have indeed become more accountable and responsive to their 
clients. Moreover, there is now an element of formal accountability in that kebele cabinets and councils 
are involved in the evaluation of DA performance. This is reinforced by informal mechanisms: Given the 
increased level of contact between farmers and DAs, word is likely to get back to the WoARD rather 
quickly if a DA underperforms. 
However, this system is embedded in EPRDF political dominance. Front affiliate parties 
controlled most kebele administrations even before the 2008 elections, and now they hold almost all of 
them. Kebele cabinets, and especially the chairpersons, view themselves as the local representatives of the 
government and their job as that of implementing government orders and policy directives. In Amhara K-
2, for example, the local administration concerns itself mainly with political, legal, and security matters, 
leaving agricultural development on the back burner. All around the country, there is a tendency for local 
administrations to evaluate DAs not in terms of their technical capacity but rather on the basis of their 
political commitment. Higher levels of government reinforce this, and kebeles have found that their 
access to agricultural inputs depends on delivering a credible EPRDF majority vote (Pausewang, 
Tronvoll, and Aalen 2003).  23 
Regardless of improvements in downward accountability, DAs continue to have extremely strong 
lines of upward accountability. The evaluations of supervisors and district-based subject matter specialists 
determine their access to advanced training opportunities and promotions. Those evaluations continue to 
focus primarily on success in meeting quotas for getting farmers to adopt technology packages, including 
the women’s development package. Meeting farmers’ demands for advice outside of this framework does 
not garner favorable marks. Living and working with farmers on a daily basis has clearly increased DAs’ 
awareness of farmers’ constraints, needs, aspirations, and knowledge; this was the case for the DAs whom 
we interviewed in Tigray K, Amhara K-2, and Oromia K. Yet they acknowledged that they could work 
with farmers to address those needs only if they met their package quotas.  
Accountability Mechanisms 
Following the disputed 2005 elections, the federal government and EPRDF leadership admitted that they 
had lost the trust of many citizens. In rural areas, this was due in part to forcing farmers to adopt 
unwanted technology packages and imposing fines on those who failed to attend public meetings, even if 
they viewed such participation as useless. Following a series of public consultations in 2006, the 
government announced a set of “good governance” reforms aimed at regaining citizens’ trust (Dom and 
Mussa 2006b). 
These reforms created a number of mechanisms to enhance citizen voice and government 
accountability. In particular, the federal government expanded the number of seats on the kebele councils 
in order to improve the representation of women and youth. In addition, the creation of the new post of 
kebele manager was intended to provide citizens with a place to take grievances and demands for 
services. These institutional arrangements and approaches have real potential to improve service delivery. 
However, new local council members have not received training to help them become effective local 
leaders. In Tigray K, the council chair acknowledged that participation has a value but complained about 
a tradeoff between enhancing voice and getting things done. The risk is that participation becomes 
tokenistic and ritualized in the absence of capacity to be effective. 
In all study districts, civil society organizations are constrained in their ability to hold government 
officials—at all levels—to account. Most mass organizations in rural areas are closely tied to EPRDF 
parties. For example, since 2005, the government has encouraged farmers to join cooperatives, and 
membership has in fact increased, due in part to the availability of fertilizer and credit through these 
organizations. However, research has shown that EPRDF party members tend to dominate leadership 
positions (see review in Spielman, Cohen, and Mogues 2009). We found this to be true in the study sites; 
for example, in Amhara K-2, the head of the local co-op is also head of the local party youth group and a 
member of the kebele party leadership (as well as an Orthodox Christian priest). Likewise, the head of the 
Tigray D cooperative union (the umbrella association of district cooperatives) is a veteran TPLF leader. 
Even though our interviews suggested that these leaders are well attuned to local farmers’ demands, the 
need for loyal party members to hew to the party line trumps downward accountability to co-op members. 
Local Governance Reforms  
Deployment of Civil Servants to Kebeles 
Deployment of civil servants from the district capitals to the kebeles was a centerpiece of the 
good governance program. In addition to the extension team, health extension workers, finance officers, 
and land administration officials all reside and work in the kebeles they serve in the regions where district 
decentralization has occurred, such as Tigray D, Amhara D-2, and Oromia D. Kebele deployment puts 
DAs and other officials in touch with their clients on a regular basis and facilitates on-the-job learning 
about local problems and concerns. It also makes civil servants available to citizens on a regular basis, 
boosting citizens’ confidence in these public service providers.  24 
The new post of kebele manager has two main purposes. First, it offers residents a one-stop shop 
to which they can bring concerns, grievances, and requests for action. It is then the job of the manager to 
ensure that the right local civil servant or citizen committee takes up the issue. Second, the manager 
serves as the chief deployed civil servant, so she or he does have some supervisory functions vis-à-vis 
DAs and others, although all deployed civil servants remain accountable to their respective supervisors 
and district offices (the manager reports to the district office of capacity building). 
The deployed civil servants are also subject to several levels of citizen oversight. The expanded 
kebele councils now include standing committees concerned with various sectors, which oversee the 
relevant civil servants. At the time of our research, these committees were quite new, and there was no 
information as to their effectiveness. In addition, the kebele cabinet has some supervisory and evaluation 
functions vis-à-vis the deployed officials. The chairperson directly supervises the kebele manager, 
although we found some evidence of jockeying for position between chairpersons and managers, as seen 
in power struggles over who would hold the kebele seal that gets applied to all official documents. 
Likewise, in theory, the kebele cabinet member responsible for agriculture has oversight over the 
extension team. 
We found, however, that parallel to the deployment of DAs, federal policy is that the senior DA 
sits on the kebele cabinet as the local director of agriculture. Similarly, the school director is the cabinet 
education official and a health extension worker is the cabinet official responsible for health. On the one 
hand, this arrangement means that the local administration has ready access to technical advice. But on 
the other hand, this purchases technical competence with clear lines of authority. For agriculture, the lead 
DA is accountable to the kebele manager, but the manager in turn is accountable to the chairperson, who 
represents the cabinet and council. Yet the cabinet also includes officials who report to the manager. 
Furthermore, while the cabinet is responsible for evaluating the deployed civil servants’ work plans, this 
means that the process becomes one of self-evaluation rather than citizen oversight through the cabinet, 
which is in effect the executive committee of the council. In practical terms, the presence of the civil 
servants on the cabinet eviscerates the council’s power to appoint the cabinet and strongly reinforces 
upward accountability, since nearly half the cabinet positions are filled by civil servants, who remain 
accountable to the district government.  
We also found instances in which citizens regarded government officials not as accountable civil 
servants but as overlords. In both Amhara D-2 and Oromia D, citizens and local civil servants alike were 
reluctant to speak freely to us when district officials were present, but they became more forthcoming and 
even willing to voice complaints once these officials left. 
Stone-Carrying Participation versus Empowerment 
The good governance reforms also stressed citizen participation in public affairs, as well as the freedom 
not to participate. Citizens are no longer subject to fines if they do not show up at meetings, yet the 
expansion of kebele councils to include more female and younger members seeks to engage those 
previously excluded. However, we observed that participation tends to be less about empowerment—
citizen engagement in decisionmaking and managing development—and more about receiving 
information and contributing labor and money to public works activities. Thus, we were able to observe a 
general assembly in Amhara K-2 at which the kebele development plan was supposedly discussed. The 
meeting consisted simply of the kebele chairperson and council speaker reading the plan to the 15 or so 
people who attended. As far as labor contributions go, in Tigray region there is a formal system of corvée 
that dates to the civil war era, whereas this type of labor is supposedly voluntary elsewhere in the country. 
We observed that labor contributions—which we call “stone-carrying” participation—are in practice 
mandatory in all the study districts. 
In Oromia K, residents told us that representative bodies in the kebele and district capital did not 
offer an effective channel for improving the quality of service delivery. They complained about a lack of 
transparency and accountability on the part of the district administration. 25 
We did find instances in which participating in meetings and local institutions made a difference. 
In Tigray K, the kebele council monitors the performance of local representatives to the district council 
and ensures that they raise local concerns. In Tigray D at least, representative government does have some 
bearing on service delivery. 
Voting with Feet 
We were told repeatedly that participation in public life is voluntary, but we did not find much 
willingness on the part of kebele or district officials whom we interviewed to investigate why people do 
not attend meetings. It seems logical that people will not attend meetings if they do not find them useful 
or beneficial and there are no sanctions for non-attendance. Participation has a cost; people’s time and 
labor is not free. Attending a meeting to hear the reading of a precooked plan may not have much benefit 
to low-income farmers, especially during harvest time. And even at other times, farmers have many more 
important things to do than hear local leaders read a plan, such as meeting with neighbors, doing craft 
work, advising one another, and trading seeds.  
On the same day that the general assembly took place in Amhara K-2, we observed more than 
100 people attending a celebration of the feast of St. Michael at a local church, where they received food 
for both the soul and the belly, so to speak. The local politicians who attended the general assembly also 
went to the church along with the local citizens. Amhara K-2’s citizens view the church as important in 
their lives; public meetings do not seem to offer anything. 
People in Oromia D similarly failed to attend public meetings, voicing like explanations about not 
finding the gatherings useful. This leads to a vicious circle: Citizens do not go to meetings, so they do not 
have a voice and do not receive quality services.  
In Tigray D, in contrast, we witnessed a number of public meetings where most households in the 
kebeles appeared to be represented; women and men participated equally. In Tigray K, as elsewhere in 
Tigray, meetings have a purpose – people criticize, speak, discuss, and evaluate. The local tradition of 
public participation appears to be institutionalized.  
In our other study districts, there is much less emphasis on debate and discussion. Rather, the 
administrative culture is top-down, command and control oriented. Local leaders do not see the value of 
engaging members of the community in discussion or in planning, managing, and owning development. 
Instead, they focus on fulfilling directives from higher levels of administration. They hold meetings as 
directed and then check off a box, whether or not anyone attends or speaks.  
Women’s Participation and Representation 
These general observations about voice and accountability also apply to women’s participation and 
representation in public affairs. The good governance reforms called for women to constitute 50 percent 
of all committees at all levels, so in local governance this has become yet another quota to fill. Local 
officials point to the presence of women on council committees or in cooperative leadership bodies but 
readily acknowledge that these representatives receive little training on how to fulfill their duties. They 
are too often installed as tokens at best or set up to fail at worst. 
Patriarchal culture reinforces by-the-numbers administration in undermining women’s effective 
participation. Men often refuse to listen to women in public meetings, and leaders of local women’s 
associations in Amhara K-1 and Amhara K-2 told us that when they try to participate in discussions, men 
will laugh or jeer at them. Traditionally, women are not given leadership roles, so in Oromia D, women 
are not taken seriously as decisionmakers. Local male leaders do not tend to press for women’s 
empowerment and participation in leadership, and many civil servants share the traditional gender bias. 
Moreover, many rural women are illiterate and unused to expressing ideas publicly in a male-dominated 
society. Most of the female leaders at the kebele level whom we interviewed were single (widowed, 
divorced, or never married), meaning that they headed their households and thus were used to being 
somewhat more assertive than many married women. Husbands often discourage their wives from 
participating in public meetings. 26 
The traditional culture is somewhat contradictory on the role of women. Women’s sphere is the 
home, yet women are expected to leave the home and spend long hours fetching water and fuel, weeding 
fields, carrying stones, and planting trees. At the same time, they are not supposed to participate in public 
affairs, and their productive contributions often go unacknowledged. 
These patterns were particularly evident in Amhara K-2 and Oromia K. In BG D, the local 
Gumuz culture is more gender equitable, but we still found no women in the district leadership.  
In Tigray, the civil war experience modified ingrained male dominance somewhat, with women 
holding important political and military leadership positions during the war. The younger generation of 
women is less willing to go back to the old way of doing things. Thus, in Tigray K, the women’s affairs 
director of the kebele cabinet shunned the local tradition of early marriage after finishing high school and 
instead used her modest savings to rent land and become a successful commercial farmer, breaking out of 
the confines of traditional culture. Similarly, the women’s association in Tigray K has strongly advocated 
for credit for women, even though that goes against the grain of the community’s Islamic traditions. The 
local revolutionary legacy has helped women to become cultural innovators.  
Even in Amhara K-2 and Oromia K, we got a sense from our interviews with local leaders—both 
male and female—that increased representation did translate into enhanced voice for women and even 
possibly a greater sense involvement in, and ownership of, the development process. In Oromia K, 
enhanced female representation has led to a noticeable increase in discussion of women’s issues in the 
council. 
We also found that local women’s organizations offered women an important vehicle for gaining 
access to services and resources. While these organizations are no less party affiliated than the 
cooperatives, in some of our study sites they have proved effective in giving women voice and effective 
representation. In addition, EPRDF-affiliated parties have established women’s leagues at the kebele level 
in conjunction with expanded female representation on the councils. In both Tigray K and Amhara K-2, 
the party organization, the civil society (but party-affiliated) women’s association, and the cabinet 
women’s affairs director have worked together to create spaces where women can meet and discuss issues 
and have also facilitated women’s access to credit and extension services. International and national 
NGOs have also supported women’s empowerment. Our impression from interviews with women in these 
two kebeles is that they trusted these various institutions and viewed them as working in their interest. 
As already noted, in Amhara K-2, the women’s association is an important vehicle for working 
around cultural biases to get women access to extension services. Because many husbands tell their wives 
not to pay attention to what they learn at association meetings, the organization has held meetings with 
groups of husbands and wives to educate men about how enhancing their wives’ access to resources and 
knowledge will benefit the whole family. One association member told us that as a result, she and her 
husband now share responsibility for household economic decisions more equally. 
In contrast, we found that women’s organizations were largely missing in Oromia D and BG D. 
In Oromia D, the women’s association was largely discredited during the civil war because of its close 
association with the former military dictatorship. It was merged with the district Office of Women’s 
Affairs, and no independent association currently exists at either the district or kebele level. In BG D, 
there are similarly no independent women’s organizations.  27 
8.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
In our study sites, the approach to service delivery remains top-down, with accountability mainly flowing 
upward. Quota-based thinking remains pervasive among government officials charged with providing 
services. Thus, “empowerment” is measured by the number of farmers and women who sit on local 
committees and in district councils, not whether these representatives of the people receive resources, 
adequate capacity to carry out their responsibilities, and effective organizations within which they can 
work. The obligations of citizens—particularly community labor contributions to natural resource 
management—continue to receive emphasis over the state’s obligations to respect, protect, and promote 
the rights of its citizens. We frequently found examples of this attitude among officials during the course 
of our research. 
Recent institutional changes, such as the posting of DAs to kebeles, the creation of a local focal 
point for citizen contact with government through the kebele manager, and the expansion of local 
councils, all have great potential to enhance voice and accountability, improve the quality of services, and 
support sustainable development. But governance continues to have a top-down character, reinforced by 
the lack of separation between politics and administration. The point is not to eliminate lines of upward 
accountability but rather to link them to downward accountability to local citizens. Effective agricultural 
development requires, in effect, the sound of two hands clapping, not just one. 
Related to this, lines of authority and accountability at all levels of government need to be clear. 
DAs should advise kebele cabinets but should not sit on them; otherwise, they become judges in their own 
cases, so to speak. Local residents should serve on local cabinets, with the support of local civil servants. 
The lines between the governing political party and the public administration also need to be 
clear, recognizing that the EPRDF sets government policy. Service provision should be according to 
transparent and nonpolitical criteria, so government agricultural offices should not have party pamphlets 
on display. In Tigray D, there is no question that the TPLF is the governing party, but party materials are 
displayed in party offices, not government agencies. Other districts and regions should follow this pattern. 
To inject more downward accountability, programs need to have social as well as technical 
content and to focus on quality, not just quantity. District agriculture offices need to encourage extension 
agents to listen to farmers and collaborate with them on problem solving, rather than simply pushing one-
size-fits-all technology packages that may not fit local conditions or the circumstances of single women. 
Service quality is not a matter of centralization or decentralization, but rather client orientation, 
empowerment of service users to make demands, and ensuring that service providers have the capability 
to respond effectively. As in Tigray D, districts need to give DAs incentives for client-oriented 
performance. Extension supervisors should play a supportive role in ensuring such service provision 
rather than enforcing command and control. 
Similarly, women’s empowerment is not just a matter of counting the number of women on a 
committee or the existence of token “gender focal points.” Female leaders and members of the gender 
machinery need the tools to engage effectively in their responsibilities. Also, there are two genders, not 
one; gender equality in access to agricultural resources benefits men as well as women through increasing 
agricultural productivity. 
In Tigray D, as elsewhere in the Tigray region, the civil war legacy has institutionalized an 
environment that permits citizens to articulate their demands, engage in negotiation with officials, and 
take initiative. Other regions need to adopt such an approach. This means loosening the reins on local 
organizations such as cooperatives and women’s associations so that they can effectively represent their 
members rather than simply conforming to party guidance. 
In Tigray D, the extension service supports local learning and problem solving through cross-
learning among WoARDs and DAs and through the demonstration effects of progressive or model 
farmers. The extension service needs to be looked at with regard to poverty reduction and food security 
from a livelihoods perspective within a wider, poverty-focused policy environment. The recent trend of 28 
scaling up good practices and tested technologies has the potential to promote participatory and bottom-
up approaches to extension rather than focusing on promotion of fixed technology packages. 
Many of the institutional arrangements we studied have the potential to advance sustainable 
development and poverty reduction as well as gender equality. We see some progress, especially in 
Tigray D, but also on gender matters in Amhara D-2. In general, the DAs in Tigray D, Amhara D-2, and 
Oromia D have a very good sense of what the problems in their areas are and, if given the right incentives 
and support, could help farmers improve their situation. What is most important is to make the bottom-up 
activities that exist on paper a reality, particularly local planning and management of development, with 
appropriate voice, accountability, and recourse mechanisms that actually function. This would fulfill the 
promise of the two waves of decentralization and help make the district governments the node in the 
network that harmonizes top-down and bottom-up development. 29 
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